Maryland\u27s All-Payer Health Care System: A Light at the End of a Tunnel by Bakhamis, Lama et al.
Marshall University
Marshall Digital Scholar
Management Faculty Research Management, Marketing and MIS
2017
Maryland's All-Payer Health Care System: A Light




David P. Paul III
Alberto Coustasse
Marshall University, coustassehen@marshall.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/mgmt_faculty
Part of the Health and Medical Administration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management, Marketing and MIS at Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Management Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact
zhangj@marshall.edu, martj@marshall.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bakhamis, L., Matsumoto, T., Tran, M., Paul, D. P. 3rd, and Alberto Coustasse. Maryland’s All-Payer Health Care System: A light at the





Maryland’s All Payer Health Care System: A Light at the End of a Tunnel  
 
Lama Bakhamis, MS  
Healthcare Administration Program 
Marshall University 
College of Business 
100 Angus E. Peyton Drive 
South Charleston, WV 25303 
 
Taeko Matsumoto, MS 
Healthcare Administration Program 
Marshall University 
College of Business 
100 Angus E. Peyton Drive 
South Charleston, WV 25303 
 
Mary Tran, MS 
Healthcare Administration Program 
Marshall University 
College of Business 
100 Angus E. Peyton Drive 
South Charleston, WV 25303 
 
David P. Paul, III, D.D.S., M.B.A., Ph.D., M.A. 
Professor of Marketing and Health Care Management 
Leon Hess Business School 
Monmouth University 
West Long Branch, NJ 07764 
(732) 263-5336 
(732) 263-2150 FAX 
dpaul@monmouth.edu 
 
Alberto Coustasse-Hencke,  Dr. PH, MD, MBA, MPH 
Professor of Healthcare Administration 
Marshall University 
College of Business 
100 Angus E. Peyton Drive 
South Charleston, WV 25303 
(304) 746-1968 











The state of Maryland, in collaboration with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, 
developed the first all-payer system model in the U.S. in 1971, and some 35 years later in 
response to financial pressures modernized this program.  The focus of the modernized program 
was to improve overall per capita expenditure, quality of care, and the outcome of Marylanders’ 
health. The financial status of Maryland hospitals was declining due to the rate setting of the 
Health Services Cost Review Commission while hospital admission rates and spending was 
increasing.  In the original version Maryland did not have a quality measure for Medicare 
waiving.  In the modernized program, Maryland’s goal was to move 80% of hospitals in the state 
to Global Budget Review, defined as when 95% of Maryland hospitals’ revenue was received 
under the state’s global budget which is not defendant on volume (HSCRC, 2014).1  In addition, 
Maryland hospitals have become more financially stable: in 2015, the per capita annual revenue 
of Maryland hospitals has grown from 1.47% in 2014 to 1.81%, and the average operation 
margin averaged 4.79%.  This study showed positive change in moving its healthcare delivery 
model from volume-driven care to value-driven coordinated care.  Maryland hospitals have 
changed their mindsets to achieve the Triple Aim of cost reduction, health improvement, and 









In 2014, Maryland and Center for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) jointly announced they 
would modernize the state’s 40 year old all-payer system into a new all payer system focusing on 
overall per capita expenditure, quality of care, and outcomes of Marylanders’ health.  According 
to Reinhardt2 (2011), an all-payer system is one in which all payers pay the same price for the 
same service: i.e., a third party establishes prices paid by all public, private, or individual payers, 
including hospital systems, physicians and other health care providers. Countries using an all-
payer system, such as Germany, France, the Netherland, and Japan, have demonstrated 
substantial successes in offsetting providers’ pricing escalation3 (White, 2009) and although 
versions of all payer systems had been attempted in four states (Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and New York), by 2012 Maryland was the only state in the U.S. continuing to operate 
such a system (Murray, 2012).4    
Maryland’s Original All Payer System  
Maryland’s all-payer hospital reimbursement model shifted financial incentives to reward 
results instead of volume, with the goal of achieving healthier communities while simultaneously 
slowing spending growth.  CMS waived its right to set Maryland hospital Medicare rates for five 
years in return for Maryland’s commitment to keep hospital inpatient costs below the national 
average.  The agreement covered Medicare hospital inpatient care and costs per visit only5 (PCC, 
2014) for all payers, governmental, commercial, and self-pay (HDHMH, 2013).6  Despite 
covering all payers, because Maryland’s system applied only to hospital rate setting, it is 
technically a “modified” or “limited” all payer system; this detail is virtually always ignored and 
Maryland’s system is commonly referred to as an “all payer” system, a convention also used 
throughout this paper.  The prices were determined by a government regulated agency, the 





service for each hospital (MHA, 2015a).7  The rate is set differently for each hospital, depending 
on criteria such as number of patients admitted with health insurance; e.g., for 2015, the price of 
a vaginal delivery in Adventist Health Care Shady Grove Medical Center in Maryland was set to 
$5,4667 (Maryland Health Care Commission, 2015a), while the price for the same service when 
delivered at Johns Hopkins Hospital was set at $13, 1378 (Maryland Health Care Commission, 
2015b).  
According to Murray (2009)9, Maryland’s all payer system was developed by the 
Maryland legislature to allow State government to regulate and set prices of acute care hospital 
services across the state.  Maryland and the United States had experienced increasing costs of 
hospital cares after the creation of Medicare and Medicaid: in the U.S., hospital care accounted 
for 5.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and $108 billion (measured in 2002 dollars) of 
health care spending in 1960, and these figures rose to 15 % of GDP and $1.6 trillion in 200210 
(Goldman and McGlynn, 2005) during this period, Maryland’s hospitals providing services for 
the uninsured were facing insolvency (Murray, 2009).9  In 1977, HSCRC successfully negotiated 
with CMS to participate in a modified all payer system which would cover only hospitals (CMS, 
2015).11  
An explicit condition given by CMS to allow Maryland to develop its initial all payer 
system was that the cumulative growth payment of Maryland’s Medicare spending per discharge 
after 1981 had to be less than the U.S average (Colmers, 2014).12  Consequently, Maryland’s 
goals in the development of its original all payer system were to constrain hospital’s cost 
inflation, to ensure hospitals’ financial stability by providing predictable payment system, to 
preventing cost shifting, to increase access to health care for Maryland’s citizens, and to increase 





Maryland’s original all payer system became necessary when many Maryland hospitals faced 
insolvency and its Medicare waver was in jeopardy. 
Modernized All Payer System 
 According to HSCRC (2014),1 effective January 1, 2014, Maryland and CMS reached an 
agreement to modify its existing all payer model for hospital services payment.  This revision 
was necessary because the hospital admission rate in Maryland had increased substantially, 
causing increases in overall hospital spending (Anderson and Herring, 2015).13  MHA14 (2015b) 
stated that with the modernized all payer system, the State of Maryland would focus on reducing 
costs, improving the health of the population of Maryland, and improving quality of care, the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s Triple Aim (IHI, 2016).15  
In the modernized all payer model, HSCRC would still set prices for inpatient hospital 
services, but Maryland hospitals would be required to adopt a Global Budget Revenue (GBR) 
reimbursement within 3 years, starting from 2014 (PCC, 2014).5  According to HSCRC16 (2013), 
the GBR system was a revenue constraint as well as quality improvement method. Under the 
GBR system, each hospital would receive an approved regulated revenue each year and be 
required to operate within the budget. Also, in GBR the volume of care would not affect the 
revenue determination, which discouraged hospitals from increasing admissions in order to 
increase revenue.  Furthermore, the GBR encouraged hospitals to be more effective to provide 
care for population, to decrease potential avoidable utilization (HSCRC, 2013).16 
Along with GBR implementation, Maryland also agreed to improving quality of care by 
reducing potentially preventable conditions, including the 30 day hospital re-admission rate and 
the number of hospital-acquired conditions: one goal was for the 30 day hospital re-admission 





be reduced by 30% by 2018 (HSCRC, 2014a).17  The other agreement was to save $330 million 
in Medicare spending by the end of fiscal year 2018 (CMS, 2014).18  In order to accomplish 
these financial goals, Maryland set a cap limit of 3.58% on annual total hospital cost growth in 
the first 3 years by 2017.  Maryland and CMS agreed that if Maryland did not accomplish the 
targeted goals by fiscal year 2018, it would move back to old Medicare payment system (CMS, 
2014).18   
The purpose of the study was to examine the original and modernized versions of 
Maryland’s all payer system, and determine possible efficiency and sustainability of the 
modernized all payer system.   
RESULTS 
Original Version All Payer System Results 
Achievements of Original All Payer System 
Major accomplishments of Maryland’s original all payer model were: elimination of cost-
shifting, lowered costs for all payers, limitation of the growth of hospital per admission cost, 
provision of stable and predictable income for hospitals, promotion of financial stability for 
efficient and effective hospitals and removal of the inequality in the burden of uncompensated 
care (Colmers and Sharfstein, 2013; MDHMH, 2013).19,20  Because Maryland has eliminated 
cost shifting, hospital bills in Maryland were much lower than any other states; for example, 
average cost of hospital charges for a joint replacement for a Medicare patient in 2013 varied 
from $88,238 in California to $21,230 in Maryland (Cauchi and Valverde, 2013).21 Also, 
Maryland’s hospitals’ markups of price over cost became the lowest in the nation: in 1980 the 
national average markup of hospital charges in the US was less than 25% and Maryland was 





have increased to over 200% while Maryland’s markups remained essentially unchanged in 1980 
(Murray, 2014).23  Another way of looking at prices in Maryland hospitals is to examine the 
adjusted costs per hospital admission: when Maryland first developed its all payer system, its 
adjusted costs per hospital admissions was about 26 percent higher than the national average. 
Between 1977 and 2009, however, Maryland’s hospitals had the lowest cumulative increase per 
admission of any state in the nation (2 percent compared with a 4.5 percent increase for the rest 
of the nation) ((Cauchi and Valverde, 2013).21 
Between 1976 to 2009, Maryland’s health care cost growth was the lowest in the U.S. 
(Foreman, 2014).24  In 1976 the amount spent on patient care in Maryland hospitals was 25% 
higher than the national average and after the implementation of an all-payer system it began to 
decline; by 2009 it was 4% below the national average (MHA, 2013).20  It is estimated that the 
savings Maryland achieved in health care costs between 1976 and 2007 exceeded $40 billion 
(Pohl, 2012).25  
Limitations of Original All Payer System 
There were, however, “storm clouds on the horizon.”  Limitations of the original version 
of Maryland’s all payer system included the continuing underlying incentives of fee-for-services 
per admission per case for hospitals, outdated measurement to evaluate efficiency of care, and a 
lack of incentives to improve population health and coordination of care (Colmers, 2015; 
Colmers and Sharfstein, 2013; National Health Policy Forum, 2014).26,19,27  
There was a significant increase (p = 0.003) in hospital admission rate in Maryland, from 
0.8% between 1990 and 2000 to 2.4% between 2001 and 2008.  (Kalman et al., 2014).28  Largely 
due to this increase in hospital admission rate, from 2013-2014 the waiver test (which measured 





decreased more than half, from 10.40% to 4.46%, and the prediction was that within a few years 
Maryland’s Medicare inpatient spending and national average would be the same or higher 
(Colmers and Sharfstein, 2013; MDHMH, 2013; PCC, 2014).19,6,5  
By 2013, the financial status of Maryland hospitals had been declining due to HSCRC’s 
tight rate settings of services; in 2013 Maryland hospitals had only average of 0.8% aggregated 
operating margins, very close to the break-even point (MHA, 2013).20  More alarming was the 
trend of the percentage of Maryland hospitals which were operation “in the red.”   The 
percentage of Maryland hospitals reporting losses was over 40% in 2012 and by 2013 had risen 
to 42% with 25 out of 60 hospitals in Maryland having negative operating margins.  
In the original all payer system, Maryland and CMS did not set a quality measure for 
Medicare waiver testing and this situation resulted in declining quality of care as reflected by a 
high hospital re-admission rate.  Subsequently, Maryland implemented new benchmarks for the 
quality of care in the all-payer system (Kastor and Adashi, 2011)29; e.g., a pay per performance 
program was introduced to improve the quality of care and it successfully reduced the hospital 
acquired conditions by 15% over a span of two years (Calikoglu, Murray and Feeney, 2012).30 
Modernized All Payer System: Early Results 
According to HSCRC31 (2015), the per capita annual revenue growth of Maryland 
hospitals was 1.47% in 2014 and rose slightly to 1.81% in 2015.  Also, Maryland set a goal to 
move 80% of hospitals to participate GBR, and in fact, all 46 hospitals in Maryland have already 
changed to GBR in the first year (HSCRC 2014).1  Further, the data has showed positive results 
for hospitals under GBR: the operation margins rate of fiscal year 2015 averaged 4.79% 





growth of Medicare spending per beneficiary was 1.50% ($100 million estimate) below national 
growth projection in 2014 (HSCRC, 2015).31 
Quality improvements have proved challenging.  One goal was for hospitals to reduce 
their all-payer adjusted readmission rate by 6.76% between calendar year 2013 and calendar 
2014, but only 15 of 46 Maryland hospitals met this goal.  As a result, the overall all payer risk 
adjusted readmission rate decreased slightly between 2013 and 2014 (from 12% to 12.52%).  
Because achieving this readmission rate decrease has proved difficult, the amount of revenue at 
risk for hospital performance was quadrupled from 0.5% in 2016 to 2.0% in 2017 and hospitals 
that met this target received a one-time reward of up to 0.5% of their permanent inpatient 
revenue (HSCRC, 2015).31 
In terms of population-based health, the direction is uncertain, as it will be based upon 
the early results which are still coming in.  Berenson32 (2015) envisions a combination of 
physician-based and hospital-based accountable care organizations and medical homes. 
Recent data does suggest that Maryland’s all-payer system is paying dividends.  It was 
recently noted that in Maryland the cost of medical visit at just $74, the lowest in the nation, 
while the state has the third-lowest insurance premium at $241 per month.  These results caused 
Maryland to be ranked second in the nation in terms of providing the best healthcare services 
delivering great health outcomes at low cost (Walker, 2016).33  In fact, Maryland’s healthcare 
costs in 2016 were ranked lowest in the nation by WalletHub, which also noted that the state had 
the third most physicians per capita (Bernardo, 2016).34  Clearly Maryland appears to be leading 






The purpose of the study was to examine the original and modernized Maryland all payer 
systems, and determine the efficiency and sustainability of the modernized all payer system. The 
literature review revealed achievements and limitations of original all payer system and also 
suggested why Maryland had to make a change to modernize its all payer system.   
Accomplishments of the original all payer system were substantial: elimination of cost 
shifting, lowering of health care cost, dramatic reduction of markups, the provision of equal 
access and pay for all Marylanders regardless of health insurance while yielding Maryland 
hospitals relief from the burden of uncompensated care.  Limitations of the original all payer 
system were also found: the system did not have strong measure to constrain overall cost of 
health care and there were no incentives or measurement for quality of care.  Eventually the 
original all payer model became outdated and unable to achieve the Triple Aim goal of 
improving patient care, quality of care, and cost of care.  
The modernized all payer system was developed to overcome weakness of the prior all 
payer system: Maryland added strategies to achieve the three goals following the Triple Aim, to 
improve population health, to provide quality care and improve patients’ experience, and to 
control cost of health care.  The findings of our study show the potential efficiency and 
sustainability of an all payer system under the new modernized version. Modernized Maryland’s 
all payer model with GBR has aimed to control health care cost by limiting hospital per capita 
growth and encouraging and rewarding hospitals to be responsible in improving health status of 
population.  The modernized all payer system has been moving its health care delivery model 
from volume-driven care to value-driven coordinated care. Maryland’s biggest achievement was 





required to change their business model and to be more accountable to provide quality care and 
for cost containment.  
Miller35 (2009) argued that better health care systems should move away from volume-
driven care to value-driven care and also should develop better payment systems which included 
benefits of both fee for service and capitation payment.  The author also emphasized changing 
payment process was not enough, but providers needed to change in their mindsets, 
organizational structure, and business model to provide better care, as one reason the U.S. has 
failed to develop better health care system has been the difficulty to change mind sets and 
organizational structure.  Maryland’s hospitals and health care provides have been working on 
changing organizational structure, business model, and mind sets in order to achieve Triple Aim; 
thus the new model has shown potential efficiency. As for sustainability, only time will tell. 
This study has some limitations.  Since the modern version all payer system was started 
in just 2014, the number of financial, performance, and case reports regarding the modern 
version of an all payer system was limited.  The search strategies used and the quality of the 
databases searched could affect the availability, quality, and numbers of articles found in this 
research. Further, researcher’s and publication biases could also affect the results of the study.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The original Maryland all payer system while initially successful, ultimately was not 
sustainable.  The modernized Maryland all payer system appears to exhibit more efficiency and 
potential financial feasibility in achieving triple aim than the state’s original all payer model.  If 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the modernized Maryland all payer model can be 
demonstrated, more widespread implementation of this (or a similar) model may be appropriate, 





program appear to be unconcerned with its generalizability (Berenson, 2015)32, while others 
(Coyle, 2015; Slusky, 2014)36,37 are more positive regarding their state’s adoption of at least part 
of the modified Maryland model.  Massachusetts and Vermont are apparently considering the 
adoption of an all payer model (Zemel and Riley, 2016)38, with Vermont having applied to CMS 
for a waiver allowing it to implement its own all payer system (Dickson, 2016)39, a move which 
has been “in the works” for some time (Hsiao et al., 2011).40  This waver has recently been 
approved, with CMS granting Vermont $9.5 million in startup funding for its statewide voluntary 
all-payer ACO model (CMS, 2016).41 
The modernized model does require hospitals and business people to change their 
mindset to be responsible in providing health care all citizens, resolving social issues such as 
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